My Next David Skarbek-esque Post: The Federalist Papers and Legislative Tenure, Part 2

It's Friday morning, that means more Federalist Papers! I'm still on the topic of legislative tenure, so today's post supplements the last time I blogged on the idea.

Onwards! Scroll past the quotes if you just want to read what I have to say.

- Federalist 62 (Madison):

"The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the government...From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national transactions."

"To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume."

"In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his...Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs."

"The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?"

"Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY."

"In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy."

Note, again, the line Madison has to walk in the first part. He feels stability is good-- and has to argue as such, because a six-year appointment of a Senator is an eternity in Revolutionary America. But underlying all of this is the fact that, in part, the stability of the British monarchy was something they didn't like. It's funny to see the ebbs and flows throughout the papers.

The second part is currently a favorite quote...with or without 'mutable.'

It's very interesting the connection between stability in the political sphere and vitality in the economic sphere in the third part. I suppose it's all a matter of degree; having just overthrown their colonial government ten years prior, stability and international recognition might have been exactly what the country needed most. But lack of national character comes from mutability? Aren't some countries known for nothing but mutability? It's hard to imagine what level of turnover they speak of, but even in the worst, most severe cases...are neighboring countries left imagine their unrealized gains from trade? Is Iran bemoaning the potential gains from trade they aren't realizing from Iraq? Perhaps. I do like how political instability is pinned to international economic shortcomings.

Implicit in the fourth part is that more laws come from higher turnover. I'm not certain there's any reason to believe that's true. Poisons the blessings of liberty? That's a bit much. Undermine long-term confidence in the stability of law in the most extreme case, perhaps.

Part five is public choice Publius! I love these parts. Another testable hypothesis...more turnover, more rent seeking?

Part six talks more about the shortcomings, again, of an unstable political climate and it's skewing of investment away from long term projects.

Ultimately, I think the impact on the economy of a presidential change in the late 1700s is far, far greater than a change in more recent days, and it's important to remember that grain of salt when going through the quotes.

My Next David Skarbek-esque Post: The Federalist Papers and Legislative Tenure

I always feel like fellow blogger David Skarbek when I post something that might contain academic value. (Emphasis on 'might.')

Anyhow, when I'm interested in a topic, I find it useful to break out the Federalist Papers and seeing what those three had to say on the topic. Currently, I'm interested in all things legislative tenure. Onwards!

- Federalist 39 (Madison):

"If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different formsof government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior."

"It is sufficient for such a government (MER: a republic) that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can well be organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character." (emphasis in original)

"According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior."

Nothing too surprising here. Remember, limited office is a big topic at the time-- monarchy and its indefinite rule wasn't the most popular idea at the time. It is interesting that judges pretty much get a free pass.

- Federalist 53 (Madison):

"The period of service ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service."

"In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant... The great theater of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform that they vary in every State...public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learned in any other place than in the central councils, to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire."

"...the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it."

"A few of the members, as it happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members and the less information of the bulk of the members, the more apt they will be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them."

The final quote has public choice written all over it. Should a gap develop between tenured, in-the-know legislators and the new, still-learning-the ropes legislators, then self-interested action will likely increase.

The earlier quotes in Federalist 53 concern the fact that most State constitutions at the time had tenure of representatives at one year, yet the Constitution was proposing tenures of two years.

My Skarbek-esque post: Federalist 11

So I did last night what so many other Americans do every Friday night-- read the Federalist Papers. #11 caught my eye-- as did Hamilton's description of tariffs, trade and politics. He starts with the following hypothetical: "Suppose...we had a government in America capable of excluding Great Britain...from all of our ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her politics?" After stating that the arguments of the day posited little to no effect on Britain's policies, Hamilton lets fly this nugget:

"A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Great Britain from such a state of things, conspiring with the prepossessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the American trade and with the importunities of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands and elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade."

Now, I'm not an expert on this period of history, but after reading over this I would presume that Britain had some sort of existing trade policy against the United States at the time; nonetheless, it's intriguing that the path to remedying the situation (in Hamilton's eyes) is to hammer Britain with our own trade-impeding policies. I'm reading this as saying that if we can hurt Britain bad enough, then we can convince them to reduce their trade policies and everything will end up peachy in the end.

It begs the question: Is Hamilton the first hippy? Is there any reason to believe, especially given the recent history at the time between Britain and the U.S., that an aggressive trade policy is going to lead to a greater degree of openness in the long run between the two nations? It's not to say that this situation couldn't happen-- but how could this be put forth as the deductive outcome?

Some other choice lines from Federalist 11...

Hamilton on his hopes for America in the world's economy:

"By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate."

Hamilton on neutrality:

"The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral."

(Wasn't Switzerland respected as neutral in World War II?)

Hamilton on the importance of military security:

"It would be in the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our being theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it and confine us to passive commerce."

Hamilton on the composition of foreign trade:

"The variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value than with a small number of materials of the same value, arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets."

An intriguing read.