Letters

The Economist published my response to this article.

SIR – You suggested that the supply of Somali shillings is fairly fixed despite a number of forgeries (“Hard to kill”, March 31st). In fact, it was the introduction of forged notes that ultimately removed the incentive to increase the supply of shillings in circulation.
The 1,000 shillings note exchanged for roughly $0.13 when General Muhammad Aideed employed a printing firm to reproduce the note in 1996. As the number of notes in circulation grew, the exchange value fell to just $0.03, which is the cost of producing an additional note. Since the exchange value equals the cost of production, forgers can no longer profit by increasing the supply. Today, the Somali shilling is a commodity money. Its supply is governed by the cost of ink and paper required to produce a note.

Andolfatto on Fiat Money and Somalia

David Andolfatto, from the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, summarizes the interesting work of Ostroy, Kocherlakota, Wallace and others, who highlight the role of money as a record keeping device. He then links this literature to my paper with L.H. White on Somalia. Since we here at TPS relish in shameless self-promotion, I thought I'd send this along.

Thanks to Andolfatto for linking to our paper!

What I've Been Writing

In my latest working paper, I consider the debate between Friedman and Hayek in the 1970s and 1980s following the publication of Hayek's Denationalisation of Money. Here's the abstract:

Hayek (1976, 1978, 1984, 1990) is often credited with the resurgence of interest in alternative monetary systems. His own proposal, however, received sharp criticism from Friedman (1984), Fischer (1986), and others at the outset and never gained much support among academic economists or the wider population. According to Friedman, Hayek erred in believing that the mere admission of competing private currencies will spontaneously generate a more stable monetary system. In Friedman’s view, network effects, to use the modern term, discourage an alternative system from emerging in general and prevent Hayek’s system from functioning as desired in particular. I offer new evidence provided by recent events in Somalia as support for Friedman’s initial doubts.

As some of you will no doubt recognize, this builds on my earlier work with Larry White.

What I've Been Writing

As Walter Williams often remarks, “It's a poor dog that won't wag its own tail."

.tailwag

Title:
Positively Valued Fiat Money after the Sovereign Disappears: The Case of Somalia (w/ L. H. White)

Abstract:
Economists commonly invoke sovereign powers to explain the acceptance of unbacked paper money at a positive value. The government accepts or compels taxes paid in the money (makes it publicly receivable) or compels creditors to accept it (grants and enforces legal tender status). Thus fiat money is thought to rely on enforcement of a literal fiat or decree. The case of Somalia defies this account: following the state’s collapse in 1991, unbacked paper Somali shillings continued to circulate at a positive value. We explain how historical acceptance, or “inertia,” can sustain the ongoing acceptance of unbacked money even in the absence of ongoing sovereign support. Although sovereign power might be necessary to launch a fiat standard, we conclude that it is not a necessary condition for its survival.

You can download the full version here. Also, my book review of Jimmy Stewart is Dead appears in the most recent issue of Economic Affairs.

./tailwag

One Line to Sum Up Somalia

From the NYT:

Somalia’s sheer ungovernability is both its curse and its blessing.

HT: Pete B.

Circumventing International Recognition

In 1991 Somaliland declared independence from Somalia. Unlike the rest of Somalia, Somaliland has managed to establish a degree of peace in the time since. It prints it's own currency, the Somaliland shilling, and issues passports. The problem: Somaliland is not recognized by the international community. The solution:

At various roadside junctions in central Hargeisa currency vendors sit at battered metal containers piled high with brick-size wedges of Somaliland shillings, US dollars and Euros. Wedged into these stacks of cash are Somali passports.

“We sell these passports because our government is not recognised, so if we want to do business outside Somaliland we have to use this document”, 26 year old Hussein told me flicking through the front pages of a pristine Somali passport. Adding ones details is no sweat – simply glue a photo over the box that says ‘picture’ and fill in your details by hand. A minister’s signature is required from Mogadishu – if indeed there is a Minister of Immigration -but that is easily circumvented.

“We just forge the signature”, Hussein said nonchalantly.

“And the Somaliland officials turn a blind eye?” I asked. “Of course they do”, smiled Hussein, “They have to travel on these passports too”.

Anyone interested in traveling to the horn of Africa?

Working Paper: Monetary Anarchy

Here's the abstract from my latest working paper:

Many economists, from Adam Smith to Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan, have argued that free-markets only function correctly within an institutional framework that stipulates property rights, enforces contracts, and provides a medium of exchange. Furthermore, it is assumed that markets are incapable of generating this framework without the assistance of government. Specifically, Buchanan (2009) claims markets are incapable of producing a stable paper currency standard. If left to the market, Buchanan and others predict, the monetary regime will be highly inflationary. In contrast, I argue that monetary anarchy is a feasible alternative; decentralized agents acting in their own self-interest are capable of generating a stable paper currency standard. A counterfeit commodity standard—where any individual can print as many paper notes as desired without obligation to redeem these notes for some commodity—has all the self-adjusting properties of traditional commodity standards (e.g gold standard). Additionally, it has the potential to adjust more quickly to short-run fluctuations and use fewer resources than traditional commodity standards. Most importantly, the success of this standard relies only on underlying fundamentals and not the precommitments of men who might later renege. I detail the mechanics of a counterfeit commodity standard and illustrate feasibility by analyzing the quasi-counterfeit commodity standard implemented in Somalia.

An updated draft will be posted soon.