Large Hadron Collider Update: October 14, 2009

For those that follow the blog especially close, I've provided occasional updates on the progress of the Large Hadron Collider. The best background post is here, other related posts are here, here, and here. The NYT gives an update, and notes that "[i]n December, if all goes well, protons will start smashing together in an underground racetrack outside Geneva..."

The lesson, as always: With government, months means years.

(By the way, that NYT article is interesting insofar that people have written papers describing how the Large Hadron Collider is being sabotaged from the future.

A pair of otherwise distinguished physicists have suggested that the hypothesized Higgs boson, which physicists hope to produce with the collider, might be so abhorrent to nature that its creation would ripple backward through time and stop the collider before it could make one, like a time traveler who goes back in time to kill his grandfather.

Bizarre. The papers which put forth these theories are here and here.)

(Edited: Justin beat me to it!)

2009 Gus Rankings: Week 6

Here are this week's Gus Rankings. No change at the top or bottom this week. Virginia Tech gained six points over the weekend and gives a good example of the power of having defeated winning teams. Three of their points came from beating Boston College, but also got single points from victories by Duke, Marshall and Nebraska. Their single loss came to the second team in the rankings, Alabama, and they haven't lost yet. If Virginia Tech had won that game they would have a sizable advantage on the rest of the field.

At this point, it may be worthwhile to look at which conferences seem to be doing the best. I won't provide anything of length at this point, but look at the top 11 teams (3 teams tied for ninth):

SEC: 3
Big 10: 2
Big 12: 2
ACC: 1
Mountain West: 1
Pac-10: 1
WAC: 1

Should be to fun to see how it shifts around once conference play begins. Having more successful conference opponents from top to bottom should rise the tide of all the boats in the conference.

A comment on comments

I have observed for the last several months on blogs that I frequent, most notably Cafe Hayek and EconLog, that a commenter (or commentators) with the handle(s) "Justin R" and "JR" occasionally appear, without any link that helps identify the author. This person is not me. I always leave a hyperlink back to my personal webpage or TPS, and apart from an occasional violation, I leave my full name (Justin Ross). The blog author puts their reputation on the line to some extent when blogging their ideas, and I feel it is most appropriate to do the same when leaving comments, especially if that comment is leveling some kind of criticism.

Congratulations Dr. Ostrom!

With great pleasure I congratulate my colleague Dr. Elinor Ostrom for winning the Nobel Prize in Economics! As one of the co-founders of the Bloomington School of Public Choice, it is well deserved.

Here is a link to The Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, of which Lin is co-founder and senior research director.

War and Politics

That's the title of TPS friend Pavel Yakovlev's first book. Here it is at Amazon. Here is the product description:

This monograph is a collection of empirical and theoretical essays on the interplay between political regimes, military spending, and economic growth. Chapter 1 surveys the literature on political regimes, policies they choose and their economic consequences. Chapter 2 examines how democracy and conscription may affect the number of battlefield deaths and the value of a statistical life in military conflicts. Chapter 3 investigates how arms trade and military spending may affect economic growth. Chapter 4 examines the efficiency of political markets and factors influencing political polarization. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and suggests the avenues for future research.

A semi-spoiler:
The book is based on his dissertation, and one of the more interesting findings that emerge from it is that democracies substitute kapital for labor at a higher rate than dictatorships, as do countries that employ the draft. You can think of countries without a draft being forced to pay market wages for soldiers, and thus substituting to more military machinery, whereas the draft carries the ability to coerce labor at below-market wages.

If you think more elaboration on those ideas would interest you, then do check out the book. Especially if you are a doctoral student interested in conducting similar lines of research.

Disclosure: In compliance with new federal regulations, let it be known that I received no compensation for this review.

File this under: Incentives matter, not taking the escalator

Check out this video from a subway station in Sweden.

Q: How do you get more people to take the stairs?
A: Make it into a piano.

Best Careers

We've talked about best and worst jobs before, CNN Money chimes in with their top 50 careers, based on "great pay and growth prospects." College professor comes in at #3, the top end seems to be laden with health- and technology-related jobs. The way in which these rankings tend to develop rarely involves more than a smattering of consideration, though the opportunity cost of your employment is always fun to consider.

In-N-Out

Outside of consistently good Mexican food, there's nothing I miss more in the culinary realm by living in the eastern portion of the country than In-N-Out. Nothing compares. Five Guys is passable but a weak substitute.

Why do I bring this up? There's a new book about In-N-Out, and it's here.

Inventives Matter: Tax Cheats Edition

From Yahoo News (HT: Jason Oberle):

Dangle some cash and a lot of people are happy to turn in their employers for cheating on their taxes.

Since Congress beefed up whistleblower rewards in late 2006, tips about suspected tax cheats owing at least $2 million have jumped more than tenfold, the Internal Revenue Service said in a report Thursday.

In 2008, the agency received tips on 1,246 suspected tax dodgers, each owing more than $2 million. That's up from 116 big-money tips in 2007.

...

The 2006 law targets high-income tax dodgers, guaranteeing rewards for qualified whistleblowers if the company in question owes a least $2 million in unpaid taxes, interest and penalties. Tips about individuals also qualify if the taxpayer has an income of at least $200,000.

The most interesting part is the last excerpted paragaph, in my view. We don't care about cheating in the abstract, just cheating from firms with more than $2 million in unpaid taxes and individuals with at least $200K in annual income. True, on a case-by-case basis it might not be worth pursing smaller dues. However, these are the groups who will be most inclined to fight the accusations. Furthermore, smaller taxpayers in the aggregate still probably account for a good chunk of change, and excluding them from eligibility does not do much for deterrence of evasion.

My thoughts on tiebreakers in Major League Baseball

I was struck during the pregame show of last night's Twins/Tigers tiebreaker of how often these games end up being particularly competitive. Last night's game was no exception. Last year, the White Sox defeated the Twins 1-0, the Rockies defeated the Padres in an epic 13-inning game the year before that, and even more well known is the Bucky Dent game from 1978 and Bobby Thompson's legendary home run in 1951. Those are all one run games, and with the exception of last year's White Sox/Twins game-- a good game in its own right-- the other four are, independent of circumstance, in the upper one hundredth of one percent of professional baseball game sever played. What is it about tiebreakers that elicit such quality baseball? Furthermore, what is it about one game producing such high quality baseball as compared to a series? Is there something about both teams facing elimination that generates more competitive games?

Here's a list of the 13 tiebreakers that have been played in MLB history. Note that prior to 1978-- so starting with 1962 and heading back in time-- tiebreakers were 3 game series. Counting yesterday's game, there have been 8 one-game tiebreakers. Four of the games were decided by one run, and another had a 2 run difference.

Testable implications: Are Game 5s/7s in series more competitive than the previous games? Of the tiebreaker series that came down to a Game 3, one of them was a 1-run game and another was a 2-run game. I'm not going to count through baseball history, but I wonder how it all stacks up.

Further testable implications: What about other sports?

Possible policy implication: If both teams are faced with the possibility of elimination, and the games are found to be more competitive, and long run commercial interest is a function of competitive nature of important games, would professional sports leagues be well-advised to eliminate series and have a one-game-take-all playoff structure? There's a lot more to consider-- namely, ad revenue declines in a one-and-done scenario (and thus the value of purchasing broadcasting rights to a championship series), as well as cultural issues (mostly with baseball)-- but it's nonetheless worth thinking about. Oftentimes, people like to say that a seven game series is not long enough to effectively separate the better team in baseball. I don't disagree. But if seven's not good enough and there's no prospect for lengthening the series, why not move to one game if the game is likely to be very good?

Interesting note: Football is the only sport that currently lines up as coming down to one game for playoff advancement, and it is clearly the most popular of the four major sports.

Another interesting note: Basketball recently switched from 5 game series in the first round to 7 game series-- thereby reducing the chance of a double elimination game-- and the argument could be made that basketball's popularity in the recent past has declined.

Yet another interesting note: College basketball's playoff structure is one-and-done and is massively popular.

“Primacy of Theory” – Hmm. Dan Klein Chimes In

Dan Klein sent me his thoughts on the discussion that has been taking place concerning Human Action. With his permission, I am posting them here:

"Reading Emily’s post, I find myself unsympathetic with her distinction between “economic theory” and “empirical economics” (or “applied economic theory”).

Continued below the fold.
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Where philosophers including Hayek and Polanyi—and Berkeley(?), Hamilton(?), Kant(?), Spencer(?), James (?), etc., etc. – say that all observation or perception emerge from higher-level cognitive goings-on (associations, mechanisms, categorizings, etc.), no one nowadays would disagree. I take this as the nub of Hayek’s “Primacy of the Abstract,” (in New Studies), a title that is regrettable in the “Primacy.”

Hayek is against “the assertion that the abstract presupposes the concrete” (p. 37). Fine: It is wrong to say “first comes the concrete and then comes the abstract”. But I think it is a mistake to take Hayek to be saying “first comes the abstract and then comes the concrete.” In speaking of babies and lower animals, Hayek makes it pretty clear that the abstracts evolve in relation to a species/life experience.

So when Hayek says “primacy of the abstract” what he means is something like the following: Abstracts are as primary as concretes. He is not saying that all abstracts come before all “concretes”.

Now, in Hayek’s paper, I don’t notice a single occurrence of the word “theory.” Hayek is essentially talking about things like a squirrel’s perception of a nut being emergent from higher cognitive goings-on.

Emily writes:
“The observation of all facts and phenomena in the world take place through a lens of theory. For Mises, there is no such thing as observation without prior theory.”

I object to this. We should avoid saying that squirrels theorize. Likewise, when I merely observe a baseball game, I am not theorizing. Theorizing is a form of human discourse (which could of course be discourse with oneself in one’s own head). Theory is an artifact of human discourse.

A useful way to think of “theory” is as explanation. Explanation is a matter of discourse – the squirrel does not explain.

Explanation implies an explanandum. An explanandum implies some facts.

Another useful way to think of “theory” is as articulate interpretation. That too implies facts to be interpreted.

“Factual” statements are presumed acceptable to all parties of the communication.

Sure, in any discourse situation, factual statements reside within what Hayek calls “abstractions”, but if the set of statements are regarded as “factual,” then those “abstractions” are not, within the discourse situation, theory.

(My take of facts and interpretation is given on pp. 3-5 of the following paper)

Emily expounds what she identifies as the “Misesian position in acknowledging the primacy of theory.” She champions “the primacy of theory.”

But, irrespective of whether we view “theory” as explanation or as interpretation, we must have facts to do theory. I don’t see a contest of “primacy” between facts and theory. If we must speak of “primacy” – the value of which I doubt – then, in theorizing, facts and theory are dually “primary.”

Any kind of theorizing must presuppose some facts. It is by recourse to the factual that we answer the questions: Theory of what? Explanation of what? Interpretation of what?

When Emily speaks of “the primacy of theory,” I am tempted to ask her, “The theory that you say is primary is a theory of what, exactly?” Notice how Emily shifts to: “a method for developing an [unlimited number of relevant refutable hypotheses].” A “method,” hmm. Has it turned into the “primacy of method”?

Within a discourse situation, neither of the following is true:
1. The facts determine the theorizing.
2. The theorizing determines the facts.

To say that you can always open up what are treated in one situation as “factual” to dispute, that you can change the discourse situation, is true enough. But such recursion will never bring you to a “primacy of theory.”

Congrats, Thomas Johnson!

I'd like to send along a hearty congratulations to long-time TPS reader Thomas Johnson, who recently won the Chookaszian Prize, "given annually to the student or group of students at the Kellogg School of Management who have written the best paper in the area of financial risk management." The web page for the award is here. Tom's winning paper: "Approximating Optimal Trading Strategies Under Parameter Uncertainty: A Monte Carlo Approach"

Great job, Tom! Can we claim this as some shameless self-promotion? You bet!

Glad my tax money is helping this along

The Federal Trade Commission has found the scum of the Earth to crack down on-- us bloggers! Turns out that we now have to clearly disclose freebies and payments when reviewing products. So, in the interest of keeping in line, I have received one (1) complimentary book which I did not review. I also get paid seven figures for doing this. One of the two previous statements is true.

I'll leave the other bloggers to themselves to follow the law!

2009 Gus Rankings: Week 5

This week's Gus Rankings are out, you can find them here. Virginia Tech jumped up to grab the top spot, and Alabama, LSU, Iowa and Texas round out the top 5. Washington remains strong, as its two wins over teams with a combined eight wins nicely offsets their three losses to teams with a combined two losses. Rice remains last (sorry Marshall!) though the gap has shrunk.

Continued Discussion on Human Action

Roger Koppl, over at Thinkmarkets, and Will Luther (here at TPS) add several important points to the discussion of Mises’ Human Action. I will respond to Noel and quickly touch on some of the other contributions to the conversation below the fold.

+/-

Will’s comments remind of a great Rothbard quote: “It is no crime to be ignorant of economics, which is, after all, a specialized discipline and one that most people consider to be a "dismal science." But it is totally irresponsible to have a loud and vociferous opinion on economic subjects while remaining in this state of ignorance.” The same could be said of reading Human Action. As Noel quiet openly admits, he finds Human Action to be a painstaking read. Understandable. But it doesn’t take a woman’s intuition to read something before arguing over its meaning.

If you start a fight, expect a few jabs ;)

That said, Noel is not alone in the views that he holds. I am under the impression that these are common reactions to Human Action and Noel is a brave soul to raise these questions. To tie into some of the points raised in the course of this discussion by Roger and Will, I think some clarification is possible by suggesting that the way Noel is using the term theory is not at all how Mises uses the term. For Noel – and please correct me if I am wrong – theory is the same as hypothesis and conjectures.

Economic reasoning is a process of moving from an unsystematic collection of beliefs (poor theory) to a (A) systematic and internally consistent general theory of human action. From here, (B) specific hypothesis or conjectures may be logically derived involving concrete and contextual relationships and (C) confront the evidence. I think Austrians would say that if the evidence (C) doesn’t line up with the conjecture (B), check that C is consistent with what B suggests we should be looking at. If so, check the move from A to B before you reconsider A.

When developing another scientific question to examine, the relationship between B and C in t1 never forms the basis for A in t2. To be uncharacteristically (and humorously) Randian – A is A. I see my explanation as mapping with the process Will describes using the terms (A) the hardcore (B) the protective belt and (C) the given phenomenon.

Regarding Noel’s concluding statements concerning the relationship between modern economics and the natural sciences. I disagree with Noel about the degree of emulation of the natural sciences, the acceptance of the difference in the nature of social science ‘data’, and would be interested in discussing the amount of progress that has been made as a result of adopting the methods of the natural sciences. All for another day, I suppose.

Finally, the point that Roger makes about Mises being a scientist is probably the most important. To pejoratively relegate Human Action to the realm of philosophy implicitly suggests a rather low opinion on the extent to which philosophy informs science. Again, a point for another day. But as Roger points out, the contributions of Mises on such grounds as the impossibility of economic calculation under collective ownership of the means of production is not philosophy – its economic science. It is not an arbitrary distinction either.

Austrians are viewed by many as ideologically biased economists. One reason for attaching the label and making it synonymous with free market may be a failure to distinguish this type of positive theoretical argument about the relationship between private property and human action from its normative implications. Perhaps the reason Noel’s more mainstream friends call him an Austrian is not because he read one chapter in Human Action and has a publication in the RAE, but because they too conflate the economic and philosophical arguments.

Microfinance Bleg

I've agreed to participate on a panel discussing microfinance. The panel will convene in about a month, and my role is to give "the economics perspective" on microfinance. I think this means to describe theory, intuition, and existing evidence on the subject to the general public. Any recommendations on what I should read before hand?

My priors on microfinance:

• Its availability has probably made targeted populations better off, and is probably doing no harm otherwise, on average.
  
• It is probably difficult to attract financial capital to many of the areas targeted by microfinance nonprofit organizations, so there probably is not much crowding out of private investment.
  
• There is probably some desirable crowding out to the extent microfinance is a substitute for other forms of foreign aid we know are less effective.
  
• The returns to microfinance probably would not outweigh other reforms like trade liberalization, particularly in agriculture and immigration.

As a further question, in what ways is microfinance substantively different from payday lenders in the United States? Payday lending functionally seems to serve as high interest small loans to people with low incomes and poor/no credit history. Note that I see this as a favorable comparison to both microfinance and payday lenders. Empirical work on payday lenders is probably better than that of microfinance, so I would like it if I could make a plausible case for external validity.

There we go, I would appreciate it if you helped me update my prior with thoughts, counterpoints, and suggested readings.

Responding to Noel Campbell, Part Deux

I cannot help joining Emily (and Art at DOL) in responding to Noel Campbell (Noel responds to Art here).

One should not be surprised that Noel doesn't "get it." He starts his first post by noting that he's "never read Human Action once, much less twice." Personally, I don't think the Misesian position is that extreme. My initial reading of HA was consistent with most of my undergraduate economics education (from a non-Austrian perspective). In fact, I would claim that Mises is simply a classical economist in many respects.

Here's a short reading list for folks like Noel who'd like to understand what it is that (at least some of) those crazy Austrians are doing (and, whether what they are doing classifies as science). Below the fold, I briefly outline a couple points that I take from these works and show how they relate to Human Action and Austrian Economics more broadly.

Mises, L. Human Action.
Polanyi, M. The Study of Man.
Polanyi, M. The Republic of Science.
Lavoie, D. The Interpretive Dimension in Economics: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxeology.
Rizzo, M. Mises and Lakatos: A Reformulation of Austrian Methodology.

Continued below the fold.
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1. Contrary to what Joe Friday might tell you, there's no such thing as "Just the facts, Ma'am."

All so-called objective facts require an act of interpretation; and interpretation is necessarily subjective. The mere acts of asking a particular question or observing particular facts is subjective. The scientist is concerned with particular questions/facts (and not others) because of the historical context in which he finds himself. So we can cease and desist (to continue with the Dragnet metaphor) with equating science to 100% objectivity. It just ain't so, folks.

2. Less than pure objectivity does not spiral into absolute relativism where one cannot know anything.

Simply put, we can mimic objectivity from a particular position with particular assumptions. And from this position we attempt to learn more things.
Rizzo lays out a Lakatosian framework. First, we have a set of hardcore propositions that we cling to and are very hesitant to reject. For Austrians, these are things like "Human action is purposeful behavior," and "Man acts to reduce felt uneasiness." These things are what define a particular approach, in this case Austrian Economics, and cannot be changed without dismissing the approach and adopting a new approach. Next, we have a protective belt. This includes things that can change to explain a given phenomenon. Let me give an example:
The price of bread falls from $2 to $1 and yet individuals buy less bread. We could conclude that individuals are irrational (that they do not act purposefully to reduce felt uneasiness). But this would violate our hardcore propositions. So instead, we first investigate alternative explanations by adjusting those things in our protective belt. Is quantity held constant? What about quality? Because if the size of bread shrank and quality got worse, the real price of bread may have increased. Now, if after checking all those things in our protective belt we find that the only answer that suffices requires rejecting a hardcore proposition, we do just that. But this constitutes a paradigm shift. We are no longer doing Austrian Economics but something else.

Mises makes a similar point on page 19:

It is usual to call an action irrational if it aims, at the expense of “material” and tangible advantages, at the attainment of “ideal” or “higher” satisfactions. In this sense people say, for instance—sometimes with approval, sometimes with disapproval—that a man who sacrifices life, health, or wealth to the attainment of “higher” goods—like fidelity to his religious, philosophical, and political convictions or the freedom and flowering of his nation—is motivated by irrational considerations. However, the striving after these higher ends is neither more nor less rational or irrational than that after other human ends. It is a mistake to assume that the desire to procure the bare necessities of life and health is more rational, natural, or justified than the striving after other goods or amenities. It is true that the appetite for food and warmth is common to men and other mammals and that as a rule a man who lacks food and shelter concentrates his efforts upon the satisfaction of these urgent needs and does not care much for other things. The impulse to live, to preserve one’s own life, and to take advantage of every opportunity of strengthening one’s vital forces is a primal feature of life, present in every living being. However, to yield to this impulse is not—for man—an inevitable necessity.

Rather than rejecting the hardcore, Mises considers the protective belt. He notes that we get the same prediction if we adjust the utility function to include non-material considerations. Therefore, rejecting the hardcore proposition is unnecessary.

3. Human Action is not an irrefutable tract.

And Mises knew this. On page 7 he states the following:

Now it is quite obvious that our economic theory is not perfect. There is no such thing as perfection in human knowledge, nor for that matter in any other human achievement. Omniscience is denied to man. The most elaborate theory that seems to satisfy completely our thirst for knowledge may one day be amended or supplanted by a new theory. Science does not give us absolute and final certainty. It only gives us assurance within the limits of our mental abilities and the prevailing state of scientific thought. A scientific system is but one station in an endlessly progressing search for knowledge. It is necessarily affected by the insufficiency inherent in every human effort. But to acknowledge these facts does not mean that present-day economics is backward. It merely means that economics is a living thing—and to live implies both imperfection and change.

Give Human Action a read. And check out Polanyi and the others I listed above. Let's continue the conversation in the comments.

Responding to Noel Campbell on Human Action

Over at Division of Labor, Noel Campbell has thrown down the gauntlet (more here) regarding Mises’ Human Action. Art Carden responds. I was not invited to the fight, but here are my two cents. The way to understand what Mises is doing in developing a “pure logic of action” is developing theory -- that which is prior -- to Noel’s Step 1: Observation. For Mises, economic theory (praxeology) is logical system of human action. Economics, on the other hand, is the application of economic theory to empirical phenomena. This distinction is crucial to understanding Mises’ project in Human Action and elsewhere.

Continued below the fold.
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The observation of all facts and phenomena in the world take place through a lens of theory. For Mises, there is no such thing as observation without prior theory. Thus, empirical observations can either be seen through the lens of poor, under-developed theory, wrong theory, unacknowledged theory, etc etc or through the lens of refined economic theory of human action based on the ideas of marginal cost / marginal benefit thinking. For example, we look at relative prices when examining individual choice because our theory suggests that people evaluate their options on a marginal (not say, an average or absolute) basis. Either way, ‘the facts do not speak for themselves’.

The second part of Mises’ project is to emphasize that the purpose of developing a refined theory of human action is to interpret the world around us; to do proper history; to explain causal relationships from the perspective of individual action. In other words, theory influences the types of questions scientists ask. Theory determines what observations you see when you look out the window or back into history.

In other words, Noel’s point that Mises’ is “leaving off the most important step” is a criticism that I think Mises would level against the standard scientific method. Only in Mises view, that step is the theory informing history. If you take my reading of Mises, then he is saying something more along the line of “Hey guys, I’ve just outlined a method for developing an [unlimited number of relevant refutable hypotheses]. You’ve got about…oh…[two thousand years] worth of explaining [causal relationships of human history] to do. Get crackin’!”

Now that the distinction between economic theory and empirical economics is drawn, it is important to reconsider Noel’s criticism. It may still be that Mises’ development of economic theory is interesting and still irrelevant for the mainstay of economic as practiced. I disagree.

Taking a Misesian position in acknowledging the primacy of theory challenges mainstream views on what economists should do through the implications about what economists can do. If taken seriously, the relationship between economic theory and empirical investigation changes how our knowledge of economic phenomena advances.

There are serious complications (limitations) involved in advancing our stock of knowledge about social phenomena that are not present in the study of the natural sciences. We need the guide of theory to inform how we allocate our scare mental and perceptual resources to the task of making sense of the complexities of the social world. Why do social scientists need theory so desperately? Because the facts of the social sciences are not the same as the facts of the natural sciences. What we take as given are the constantly adjusting plans of millions of other individuals. The underlying variables of the social sciences (resources, tastes and preferences, skills and knowledge) do not have the stable, objective properties of the underlying variables of the natural sciences.

I would venture to speculate that the main reasons mainstream economists like Noel find the ‘primacy of theory’ point either irrelevant or uninteresting fall under some combination of the following: (a) they think their questions are already properly informed by theory, (b) the acceptable methods of investigation are well established in the profession, (c) no qualms of applying the methods of the natural science to the study of human action, maybe by adding a few caveats here and there, or (d) recognizing the differences between natural and social sciences, believe that little is “lost in translation” when applying the methods of the natural sciences to questions of individual action and social phenomena. In another post, I would argue that much of Hayek’s writings on knowledge and scientism are aimed particularly at these issues that arise from a Misesian view of the relationship between Theory and History.

Graphs that make me chuckle

Here's a fun graphic on CNN concerning bailout efforts. The y-axis rates how "bold" each respective effort was, and the x-axis measures its effectiveness. By "fun," I mean "enjoying the lunacy of the attempt."

I think I'd have all the dots in the second and third quadrant, though would have a good time deciding between which quadrant to put each dot. We're off to Oktoberfest festivities this evening; sounds like a good topic over beer. (And discussing the harvest.)

2009 Gus Rankings: Week 4

I apologize for the late release (blame the travel), but here are the Gus Rankings for Week 4.

A few brief notes:

- As expected, the variation in scores continues to increase. The top of the list, Iowa and Virginia Tech, have 7 points, and there is a consistent spread all the way to -5 points. Ties in points and record are becoming less frequent; Gus produces individual rankings for the top 7 teams.

- Washington is still strong despite two losses; USC's success and, more surprisingly, Idaho's success-- three wins each-- are driving their high ranking. Of the two games they've lost-- Stanford and LSU-- only Stanford has lost one other game.

Playing successful teams is how you do well in this ranking system. Washington, at 2 losses, is ranked higher than 9 other teams that don't have a D-IA loss yet.

- Rice has taken a sizable lead as the team #120, with -8 points, three "ahead" of #119 at -5 points. Rice hasn't won any games this year, so the following statement holds for the Owls: Rice has lost four games to D-IA opponents that, combined, have lost 8 other games to D-IA teams. Rice is one degree of separation from 12 losses only 4 weeks into the season.

- I didn't realize this until recently, but the Gus rankings also serve as a quick check to determine bowl eligibility, since only D-IA games count. Get to 6 wins and you're eligible!