Showing posts with label macroeconomics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label macroeconomics. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Blockquoting X

X = Robert E. Lucas, Jr. on Keynes and the Keynesian consensus:
I think that in writing the General Theory, Keynes was viewing himself as a spokesman for a discredited profession. That’s why he doesn’t cite anyone but crazies like Hobson. He knows about Wicksell and all the “classics,” but he is at pains to disassociate his views from theirs, to overemphasize the differences. He’s writing in a situation where people are ready to throw in the towel on capitalism and liberal democracy and go with fascism or corporatism, protectionism, socialist planning. Keynes’s first objective is to say, “Look, there’s got to be a way to respond to depressions that’s consistent with capitalist democracy.” What he hits on is that the government should take some new responsibilities, but the responsibilities are for stabilizing overall spending flows. You don’t have to plan the economy in detail in order to meet this objective. And in that sense, I think for everybody in the postwar period—I’m talking about Keynesians and monetarists both—that’s the agreed-upon view: We should stabilize spending flows, and the question is really one of the details about how best to do it. Friedman’s approach involved slightly less government involvement than a Keynesian approach, but I say slightly.

Monday, October 24, 2011

Sargent and Sims Press Conference



Although I encourage you to watch the entire video, I want to draw attention to the following quote from Sargent:
So here's a phrase that you hear; it's partly about language. You hear that US fiscal policy is unsustainable. You hear that over and over again. You actually hear it from both parties. And that can't possibly be true because government budget constraints are going to make it sustainable. So what they mean is that certain promises that people have made about taxes, entitlements, medicare, medicaid---those are incredible. They are not going to fit together. So the US fiscal policy is sustainable. It's very uncertain. It's uncertain because it's not clear which of these incredible promises are going to be broken first.

UPDATE: Peter Schiff engages in some creative editing to make it appear as if Sargent and Sims are know-nothings. Schiff uses an awkward pause and disclaimer by Sims (wherein Sims cautions the audience not to take the views of the two newest Nobel Laureates in Economics as irrefutable) to suggest Sims avoids the question. Schiff then skips from 15:35 to 16:13 (during which Sims presents his view) where Sargent says "I don't have much to add to that ... I was hoping he was going to ask about Europe." As the above quote captures, Sargent goes on to discuss his view of recent fiscal policy.

Schiff then manipulates a humorous move by Sargent---requesting a question about Europe and then, when the question is asked, deferring to Sims---to appear as if Sargent knows nothing about Europe as well. The audience recognized the humor with laughter and applause.

Shame on you, Schiff.

Saturday, August 27, 2011

Menu Costs

I'm trying out a new meme, wherein I'll post examples of menu costs captured as I wander about (or, as in the case below, attempts to avoid or defer higher menu costs). Enjoy!

Tuesday, July 19, 2011

Lucas on the Recovery

Robert Lucas gave a talk recently at University of Washington on Macroeconomic recovery in the US. His slides are available.

Lucas argues that, by imitating European policies on labor markets, welfare, and taxes, the U.S. has chosen a new, lower GDP trend. If this is correct, the weak recovery we have had so far may be all the recovery we will get. He uses these two slides to support his argument. The first shows the spread in growth rates which Lucas describes as the cost of the welfare state--note the lower trend for most of Europe. The second shows the US recovery in the recent recession.



What do you think?

[HT: PJB]

Sunday, May 08, 2011

Blockquoting X

X = J. Bradford Delong:
The fact is that we need fewer efficient-markets theorists and more people who work on microstructure, limits to arbitrage, and cognitive biases. We need fewer equilibrium business-cycle theorists and more old-fashioned Keynesians and monetarists. We need more monetary historians and historians of economic thought and fewer model-builders. We need more Eichengreens, Shillers, Akerlofs, Reinharts, and Rogoffs – not to mention a Kindleberger, Minsky, or Bagehot.
I am pleasantly surprised that he feels this way.

Friday, September 10, 2010

What I'm Writing

Roger Koppl and I are currently working on a book chapter titled "Animal Spirits and Cognition in Macroeconomics." I'll post the full draft shortly. Here's a snippet on rational expectations which (at least I hope) takes aim at the typical presentation of the assumption (you know: the Phillips curve assumes expectations are unchanged; then Friedman and Phelps said that was stupid; and Lucas, building on Muth, discovered rational expectations as the logical conclusion to the argument of Friedman and Phelps--as if no one had thought of it before):
It is historically inaccurate (and, to the extent one knows otherwise, intellectually dishonest) to claim the rational expectations assumption was discovered in the 1960s with Muth. The theoretical power behind the assumption of full and complete expectations had in fact been known for some time. Among others, Hicks (1936, p. 241) had expressed the basic idea in admitting it “unrealistic to assume that an important change in data—say the introduction or extension of a public works policy—will leave expectations unchanged, even immediately.” Rational expectations was not discovered, but rather rediscovered in the 1960s because earlier theorists had explicitly rejected the assumption. In the case of Hicks, it was assumed that “there is a psychological unknown, affecting the magnitude of the impact effect” and, as such, “[w]e must not expect the most elaborate economic analysis to enable us to see very far ahead” (p. 241). Earlier economists were aware of rational expectations and, as Meacci (2009, p. 1) describes, saw the assumption primarily as “a device […] to conceal the link between the disappointment of expectations and the theory of fluctuations.” It was not a lack of knowledge that had left the assumption largely unemployed, but the feeling that it was wholly inappropriate to use in addressing a topic so intimately linked to the process of time.
The comments are open. I'd love to hear what you think.